I don’t know who Dan Phelps is, and that annoys me, because I owe him a beer.
The clarity of this spun me round and kicked me in the unmentionables, because that’s about as good as an analogy gets.
A Financial Crisis in 565 Words
For those of you lucky enough not to be involved in it, the global financial crisis (GFC) was a gigantic clusterfuck. I’ll try to explain it, badly. Don’t yell at me, I’m not a banker.
(But do, in fact, yell at bankers.)
1. In the early 2000s, interest rates were very low, construction and building materials had a pretty regular cost, and housing inventory was OK. More than anything else, house prices kept going up. People thought they would rise indefinitely, so did banks. So if anyone got under water on a mortgage, you could just sell or refinance. Hack financial analysts frequently encouraged everyone with at least two teeth to buy as many houses as possible.
2. As a consequence, anyone with two nickels to rub together could get a mortgage. (Literally – one of the types of mortgage was called a NINJA loan; no income, no job / assets). Now, say you’re a bank and you own that mortgage (remember, that’s what mortgages are, a commodity that’s bought and traded… someone sold mine last year, now I make repayments to a completely different set of people).
3. Then, there was a collective misunderstanding. Traditionally, mortgages are a very safe asset to own. People pay them back because they like living indoors. An equity made out of a massive bag of regular mortgages like mine is a very safe asset that just pays you money over time. But these weren’t safe old-school mortgages, they were risky as hell.
4. Instead of selling the individual mortgages (like they did with mine), you’d package thousands of mortgages up into mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These could be bad, a la ‘hey, this guy is a part-time bear trainer in a vegan circus, and he has a mortgage on a 5-bedroom house?’
5. Now, my mortgage is good – I’m going to pay it back. But many of them are less good – more money, at a higher interest rate, to people with less ability to pay. What do we do with those? We put them into a different but related type of security. These are great big piles of different debts that are all rolled together (similar to MBS) called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
6. CDOs are filled with vegan circus mortgage loans (which are likely to be defaulted on i.e. not paid back), but the ratings agencies (who ‘independently’ determine how risky these assets are) rated them as being good, reliable assets. Why? (1) the people who constructed CDOs paid them (2) the ratings agencies were in competition with each other, and whoever gave the best ratings got more business (3) they had a drastically outdated conception of the reliability of mortgage debt: historically solid (see 5.), but contemporaneously explosive (see 2.).
7. Let’s not bother with tranches, but synthetic CDOs are important: these are also tradable assets, but they aren’t bags of mortgages, they’re bags of credit default swaps betting on mortgages. Basically, they’re insurance contracts. And here’s the secret sauce: because you don’t need new mortgages to trade them, you can just design a new one from scratch and let people buy it again and again.
8. Then everyone started to default on the loans, and the housing market started to soften. This means the MBS market fail, the CDO market fails, and a massive ripple extends through the gigantic insurance market betting on the CDOs.
9. Splat.
Introducing The Mortgagepaper
Having established the above, we can now write an entire explanation of both the CDO’s role in the 2008 financial crisis starting in the housing market and the growing unreliability of meta-analysis using a common term: the mortgagepaper.
“Historically, mortgagepapers were solid, boring, and reliable. However, by both circumstance and design, at some point we made mortgagepapers far too easy to produce, and we started to make a lot of unreliable ones.
The explosion in the number of available mortgagepapers changed their nature as an asset. Instead of thinking about them singly, it started to become more common to contain them into collective vehicles.
So, we started to think about the market for mortgagepapers in terms of big collections of them, which were regarded as being more reliable because they were ‘diversified’ but had a common outlook.
This however does not ensure reliability if it just hides the underlying flaws in the mortgagepapers themselves. If you carefully examine the constituent mortgagepapers in any given individual collection, you realise there are some good ones and a far higher proportion of bad ones that we would initially expect.
This changes the nature of a collection of mortgagepapers from ‘generally more reliable’ to ‘a single thing which has a great inherent weakness’. Our opinion on the trustworthiness of the mortgagepaper collection needs to be updated before something terrible happens.”
Is It That Bad?
Yes.
Sorry.
My previous on the same topic.
Sleep well.
From Wikipedia:
"A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap agreement that the seller of the CDS will compensate the buyer in the event of a debt default (by the debtor) or other credit event."
"In the event of default, the buyer of the credit default swap receives compensation (usually the face value of the loan), and the seller of the CDS takes possession of the defaulted loan or its market value in cash. However, anyone can purchase a CDS, even buyers who do not hold the loan instrument and who have no direct insurable interest in the loan (these are called "naked" CDSs)." [For a fee Ugarte, For a fee...]
"...If there are more CDS contracts outstanding than bonds in existence, a protocol exists to hold a credit event auction. The payment received is often substantially less than the face value of the loan." [Cap-ered Crusaders please rejoice!]
IARC, I think it was the naked ones that caused the problem...
Under "Risk":
´The buyer takes the risk that the seller may default. If AAA-Bank and Risky Corp. default simultaneously ("double default"), the buyer loses its protection against default by the reference entity. If AAA-Bank defaults but Risky Corp. does not, the buyer might need to replace the defaulted CDS at a higher cost.´
[It gets better]:
´The seller takes the risk that the buyer may default on the contract, depriving the seller of the expected revenue stream. More importantly, a seller normally limits its risk by buying offsetting protection from another party — that is, it hedges its exposure. If the original buyer drops out, the seller squares its position by either unwinding the hedge transaction or by selling a new CDS to a third party. Depending on market conditions, that may be at a lower price than the original CDS and may therefore involve a loss to the seller.´ [... or by selling a new CDS!... to a third party!, and the party just got started!, yipeee!]
Under "Naked credit default swaps"
"In the examples above, the hedge fund did not own any debt of Risky Corp. A CDS in which the buyer does not own the underlying debt is referred to as a naked credit default swap, estimated to be up to 80% of the credit default swap market." [80%!, of course, Wikipedia remarks "when?"]
Under "Regulatory concerns over CDS"
"The market for Credit Default Swaps attracted considerable concern from regulators after a number of large scale incidents in 2008, starting with the collapse of Bear Sterns."
[That section does speak of Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, although it does mention CDS were safer than other instruments and Regulators were hands on deck. And the amounts of money lost or to be lost seem small in those 3 cases (BS, LB and AIG), but remember at some point someone is going to have to repossess houses that can´t be sold in a recession for many years to come, still are mortgaged and needed to pay taxes, maintenance, etc. But it could also have triggered a sort of bank run on many financial instruments because of hedging (the mess of who owns what and how much to whom which materializes only when someone is coming to cash out: It was an over the counter market). So Wikipedia might point to a role of CDSs, but probably more sources specific to the MBS crisis are needed]
[So vulture funds in this case, the 2007-2008 Mortgage Crisis, yet another!, displayed refinement worthy of the Court of Louis XIV, the Sun King. I´m pretty sure someone profited, there was a movie about it...]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap
Great post James!.
I assumed the people who wrote the rules, knew how to play, & walked away
no apparent regulation